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In this paper we present a critical theoretical notion of the digital divide in informa-
tional capitalism. Digital divides are seen as the result of the inherent asymmetry of  
accumulation processes in the economic, political, and cultural system of contem-
porary society and resulting structural inequalities. The empirical part of the paper  
discusses the digital divide in Nigeria as an example from Africa and shows besides  
the  severity  of  the  situation  that  the  policies  of  liberalization  and privatization  
haven’t improved the problem. In the last section we identify six potential strategies  
for the solution of digital divides. We argue that five of them are one-dimensional  
and short sighted, advanced a critique and deconstruction of neo-liberal solutions,  
and argue that an integrative strategy aiming at social, political-economical, and  
technological change is needed. 
INTRODUCTION: INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM [1]
The notion of informational capitalism was first introduced by Manuel Cas-
tells (2000) who can be considered as the most important and influential fig-
ure in information society research. However,  a more theoretical  account of 
this notion is still missing (cf. Fuchs 2007, 2006a, b). The concept of informa-
tional capitalism is here employed for stressing that the production and ac-
cumulation of economic, political,  and cultural  capital  (in the Bourdieuian 
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sense) is increasingly shaped by knowledge work and networked, computer-
based information  and communication technologies.  In contemporary  soci-
ety production,  exploitation,  power,  hegemony,  and struggles  are  increas-
ingly organized with the help of and embedded into transnational networks: 
The productive forces are strongly based on computerized network techno-
logies,  the  relations  of  production  are  taking  on  transnational  networked 
forms that result in the emergence of a flexible regime for the accumulation 
of economic, political, and cultural  capital  and the rise of transnational  or-
ganizations that try to centralize power. The stratifying and centralizing ac-
cumulation processes that make use of networks are challenged by alternat-
ive transnational networks. The rise of global networks advances the antag-
onism of the collective and networked production of capital and its individu-
al appropriation and the antagonism of the networked productive forces and 
the relations of production (Fuchs 2007, 2006a). At the heart of informational 
capitalism is an antagonism of information as commodity  and information as  
gift, it is made up of two interwoven and antagonistic systems: a commodity 
economy and a gift economy (Fuchs 2006b). Given all of these conditions it is 
feasible to speak of contemporary  society as transnational network capital-
ism or global informational capitalism. The historical novelty is not that so-
cial  relationships  are  networked,  but  that  processes  of production,  power, 
hegemony, and struggles take on the form of transnational networks that are 
mediated  by  networked  information-  and  communication  technologies. 
Global  informational  capitalism  is based on a transnational  organizational 
model,  organizations  cross national boundaries,  the novel aspect is that or-
ganizations  and social  networks  are  increasingly globally  distributed,  that 
actors and substructures are located globally and change dynamically (new 
nodes can be continuously added and removed), and that the flows of capit-
al, power, money, commodities, people, and information are processed glob-
ally at high-speed. Global network capitalism is a nomadic dynamic system 
in the sense that it and its parts permanently  reorganize  by changing their 
boundaries and including or excluding various systems by establishing links, 
unions,  and alliances  or  getting  rid  of  or  ignoring  those  actors  that  don’t 
serve or contribute to the overall aim of capital accumulation. Hence global 
informational  capitalism is a stratified class-society. It is in this context that 
the phenomenon of the digital divide can be discussed.
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THE DIGITAL DIVIDE DEFINED [2]
Manuel Castells defines the digital divide as “inequality of access to the in-
ternet” (Castells 2002: 248). Access to the internet is moreover “a requisite 
for overcoming inequality in a society which dominant functions and social 
groups are increasingly organized around the internet” (Castells 2002: 248). 
Jan van Dijk who can besides Manuel Castells be considered as the most im-
portant theorist of the network society defines the digital divide as “the gap 
between those who do and do not have access to computers and the inter-
net” (Van Dijk 2006: 178). Pippa Norris sees it as “any and every disparity 
within the online community“ (Norris 2001: 4), Ernest J. Wilson III as “an in-
equality in access, distribution, and use of information and communication 
technologies between two or more populations” (Wilson 2006: 300).
Which types of the digital divide can be identified? Jan Van Dijk and 
Kenneth Hacker (2003) argue that there are four types of barriers to access:
a) The lack of “mental access” refers to a lack of elementary digital experience.
b) The lack of “material  access” means a lack of possession of computers 
and network connections.
c) The lack of “skill access” is a lack of digital skills.
d) The lack of “usage access” signifies the lack of meaningful usage oppor-
tunities.
Van Dijk has demonstrated that in terms of physical access to computers 
and the internet, the digital divide is closing in developed countries, where-
as in developing societies it is still growing. In terms of skill access and us-
age access, the digital divide is both widening and deepening. He argues 
that information skills (the skills needed to search, select, and process in-
formation in computer and network sources) and strategic skills (the capa-
cities to use these sources as the means for specific goals and for the general 
goal of improving one’s position in society) as aspects of the skill access are 
“extremely unevenly divided among the populations of  both developing 
and developed societies” (Van Dijk 2006: 181). Concerning usage access Van 
Dijk has found that people with high levels of education and income tend to 
use database, spreadsheet, bookkeeping, and presentation applications sig-
nificantly more than people with low levels of education and income who 
favour  simple  consultations,  games,  and  other  entertainment  (Van  Dijk 
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2006: 182sq). It is naive to believe that mental and material access is enough 
so that problems of skill access and usage access will diminish (Van Dijk 
and Hacker 2003). But faith in bridging the digital gap in this way is wide-
spread in science. 
Pippa Norris (2001) describes the digital divide as a multidimensional 
phenomenon. She distinguishes between the global digital divide, the social 
divide, and the democratic divide:
Table 1: Pippa Norris’ dimensions of the digital divide (Norris 2001: 4)
Types of digital divide Signified by
Global divide
Divergence of internet access between 
industrialized and developed societies
Social divide Gap between information rich and 
poor in each nation
Democratic divide
Difference between those who do, and 
do not, use the opportunities of digital 
resources to engage, mobilize and 
participate in public life
For Norris the social divide includes the income gap, which makes a differ-
ence between those who can afford computer and internet access and those 
who can’t. Castells furthermore identifies an education gap, an ethnical di-
vide, an age gap, a family/single gap, and an ability/disability gap (Castells 
2002). For Wilson (2006) there are eight aspects of the digital divide: physic-
al access (access to ICT devices), financial access (cost of ICT services relat-
ive to annual income), cognitive access (ICT skills), design access (usability), 
content access (availability of relevant applications and information online), 
production access (capacity to produce one’s own content), institutional ac-
cess (availability of institutions that enable access), and political access (ac-
cess to the governing institutions where the rules of the game are written). 
Wilson relates these eight aspects to six demographic dimensions of the di-
gital divide: gender, geography, income, education, occupation, and ethni-
city. 
The core of society consists of three subsystems (cf. Fuchs 2005, 2003a): 
-14-
C. Fuchs, E. Horak: Informational Capitalism and the Digital Divide in Africa
the economic system in which use values and property that satisfy human 
needs are produced, the political systems in which power is distributed in a 
certain way and collective decisions are taken, and the cultural system in 
which skills, meaning, and competencies are acquired, produced, and en-
acted in ways of life. This distinction can e.g. be found in the works of An-
thony Giddens who says that symbolic orders and forms of discourse are 
concerned with the constitution of rules (culture), that political institutions 
deal with authoritative resources (polity), and that economic institutions are 
concerned with allocative resources (economy) (cf. Fuchs 2003c); as well as 
in the works of Pierre Bourdieu who distinguishes economic, political, and 
cultural capital as the three structural features of society (cf. Fuchs 2003b). 
Hence we argue that besides general social forms of the digital divide, there 
is also an economic divide, a political divide, and a cultural divide.
Technologies enable and constrain human practices, their main dimen-
sions are the material access to them (in modern society mainly with the 
help of money as technologies are sold as commodities), the capability to 
use them, the capability to use them in such ways that oneself and others 
can benefit, and embedding institutions. The digital divide refers to unequal 
patterns of material access to, usage capabilities of, and benefits from com-
puter-based information- and communication technologies that are caused 
by certain stratification processes that produce classes of winners and losers 
of the information society, and participation in institutions governing ICTs 
and society. Material access refers to the availability of hardware, software, 
applications, networks, and the usability of ICT devices and applications. 
Usage and skills access refer to the capabilities needed for operating ICT 
hardware and applications, for producing meaningful online content, and 
for  engaging  in  online  communication  and  co-operation.  Benefit  access 
refers to ICT usage that benefits the individual and advances a good society 
for all. Institutional access refers to the participation of citizens in institu-
tions that govern the internet and ICTs, and to the empowerment of citizens 
by ICTs to participate in political information, communication, and decision 
processes. Stratification patterns are on the one hand social hierarchies such 
as age, family status, ability, gender, ethnicity, origin, language, and geo-
graphy (urban/rural).  These categories have resulted in different types of 
the social divide. On the other hand unequal patterns of material access, us-
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age capabilities, benefits, and participation concerning ICTs are also due to 
the  asymmetric  distribution  of  economic  (money,  property),  political 
(power, social relationships), and cultural capital (skills). Hence there is also 
an economic divide, a political divide, and a cultural divide. In modern so-
ciety structures  take on the form of capital  that  is  accumulated and un-
evenly distributed so that different social classes and class fractions with a 
different (high, medium, low) total amount of economic, political, and cul-
tural capital are created (cf. Fuchs 2003b). The reason why there are gaps in 
access, usage/skills, benefit, and participation concerning ICTs is the multi-
dimensional  class-structure  of  modern  society  that  creates  structural  in-
equalities. People with high income, far-reaching and influential social rela-
tionships, good education and high skills are much more likely to have ac-
cess to ICTs, to be capable of using ICTs, to benefit from this usage, and to 
be  supported in political  participation by ICTs than people who are  en-
dowed with only a little amount of economic, political, or cultural capital. 
Table 2 summarizes aspects and dimensions of the digital divide.
Table 2: Aspects and dimensions of the digital divide
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Jeffrey James (2003: 45) defines the global digital divide as “the strikingly 
differential extent to which rich and poor countries are enjoying the benefits 
of information technology“ and as “the unequal distribution of computers, 
internet  connections,  fax  machines  and so  on between countries“  (James 
2003: 23). What Pippa Norris and Jeffrey James call the global digital divide 
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is mainly an aspect of the economic divide because it concerns the differ-
ence in access to and usage of ICTs between rich countries and poor coun-
tries. Poor countries are those endowed with little economic capital, people 
there are much less likely to be able to access ICTs, to know how to use 
them, to benefit from usage, and to participate in embedding institutions. 
Developing countries are not only economically excluded, but also deprived 
of political power and cultural skills needed for active participation in the 
information society.
AFRICA AND THE DIGITAL
DIVIDE: THE CASE OF NIGERIA [3]
Table 3 presents an actual internet usage statistic for Africa (Africa internet 
Usage and Population Stats, data from 2006). An internet user is in this stat-
istical analysis defined as a person having available access to an internet 
connection  point  and  the  basic  knowledge  required  to  use  the  internet 
(http://www.internetworldstats.com/surfing.htm).
Table 3: Internet usage in Africa and on the globe 2006
(Source: Internet World Statistics: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm,
data accessed on November 1st, 2006)
REGION Population (2006 Est.)
Share of 
World Pop.
Internet Users, 
Latest Data 
(March 2006)
Internet 
Penetration 
(% Population)
% Users 
in World
TOTAL 
FOR 
AFRICA
915 210 928 14.1% 32 765 700 3.6% 3.0%
REST OF 
THE 
WORLD
5 584 486 132 85.9% 1 053 485 203 18.9% 97.0%
WORLD 
TOTAL 6 499 697 060 100.0% 1 086 250 903 16.7% 100.0%
Although Africa makes up 14,1 percent of the world population, only 3,0 
percent of all internet users live in Africa. In 2006 of 57 African countries 
only 3 countries had access rates higher than the worldwide internet usage 
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rate of 16,7% (Reunion, Saint Helena, Seychelles), and only six of 57 African 
countries had access rates higher than 10% (Fuchs/Horak 2007). 20 of the 57 
African countries in 2006 had access rates lower than one percent (Ibid.). 
This shows that the digital divide is a very pressing problem – most African 
countries are excluded from informational capitalism. If the information so-
ciety should really be a global village (Marshall McLuhan), a digital agora, 
or virtual community (Howard Rheingold), internet access and usage for 
developing countries would have to be assured because communities and 
democracy are inclusive and participatory rather than exclusive and seg-
mented. Cyberspace in its current form as a socio-technical system that only 
gains meaning through human activities and communication is a segmen-
ted space  that  reflects  the  inequalities  of  society.  Concerning Africa  one 
hence can also speak of a digital apartheid that has real-world causes such 
as the unequal global distribution of resources. Digital apartheid means that 
certain groups and regions of the world are systematically excluded from 
cyberspace and the benefits that it can create.
As an example of the global digital divide we will now discuss the situ-
ation in Nigeria (for a discussion of Ghana and South Africa as two other 
examples see Fuchs/Horak 2007).In 2005 Nigeria was among the least de-
veloped countries in the world, with a HDI of 0,453 it was ranked number 
158 out of 177 countries (UNHDR 2005: 221) . In 2003 the life expectancy at 
birth was 43,4 years, the adult literacy rate 66,8% (Ibid.: 221). In 2003 90,8% 
of the population had to live on less than $2 a day, and 70,2% on less than 
$1 a day (Ibid.: 229). In 1996 (latest available data) the richest 10% of the 
population had 40,8% of the income, the poorest 10% 1,6% (Ibid.: 272). Ni-
geria is  the country with the 21st highest income inequality in the world 
(2005, Gini coefficient=50,6, UNHDR 2005: 272). 
The recent history of Nigeria, a former British colony that gained inde-
pendence in 1960, has been characterized by frequent military coups and 
changing totalitarian regimes, ethnic violence, and civil  war. Ibrahim Ba-
bangida became head of state in 1986 after yet another military coup. He 
agreed to sign up to the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program which has 
resulted in a continued focus of Nigerian politics on privatization and de-
regulation  of  the  economy.  Babangida  was  overthrown  in  1993  by  Sani 
Abacha who died in 1998. After Abacha’s death Olusegun Obasanjo gained 
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power as head of state after elections were held. The Obasanjo government 
has  continued  the  neo-liberal  reforms  that  were  in  former  times  rather 
blocked by political instability and has accelerated the speed of privatiza-
tion and liberalization.
In 1985 Nigerian Telecommuniations Limited (NITEL) was established as 
a public monopoly provider for telecommunications services by a merger of 
two prior existing public telecommunications institutions. In 1992 the Nigeri-
an Communications Commission (NCC) was founded in order to provide li-
censes  to  private  telecommunications  operators.  NITEL  (which  provides 
fixed lines as well as mobile lines (Mtel)) was privatized in 2006, the Nigeri-
an firm TransCorp purchased  75% of the company’s  shares.  In the cellular 
phone market the major providers are MTN, Econet, NITEL, and Globacom. 
In the area of fixed lines there are NITEL and Globacom.  One also finds a 
number of smaller private operators such as Mobitel,  Multi-Links, Reliance, 
Starcomms, and Intercellular in the areas of telephony and internet. 
The  National  Policy  of  Telecommunications  by  the  Federal  Ministry  of 
Communication of Nigeria (2000) has set itself as a goal the “total liberaliza-
tion, competition and the private sector-led growth of the telecommunications 
sector”, it argues that the “longer term objective of this policy is to enable all 
Nigerians [to] have access to all forms of modern information and communica-
tion  technologies  and  services”  and  that  “the  privatisation  programme  is 
guided by the primary objective of expanding access to communications for all 
Nigerians,  and  ensuring  that  services  are  as  affordable  and  technically  ad-
vanced as possible”. The dogma that privatization and commercial and profit-
oriented organizations best advance universal service and universal access for 
all is never questioned. Experiences from many countries show that privatiza-
tion and private investment can improve the quality and speed of telecommu-
nications  services,  but there are several  reasons  why it is unlikely  that such 
policies will promote universal access for all in developing countries: 
a) Private-led companies  are  first  of  all  profit-oriented which means that 
they will provide cheap access only as long as they are not faced by crisis 
which is an integral feature of capitalism and competitive markets. Hence 
there is an antagonism between cheap (or even free) access and the capital-
ist crisis economy.
b) Increasing quality and speed of services require continuous investments, 
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the fixed capital costs will increase which requires increases in tariffs so that 
profitability is assured. Hence the poor and low-income classes might not 
be able to afford access. This is especially a problem in countries with high 
income inequality such as Nigeria.
c) Private firms might see the poor and low-income classes as financially 
weak and might want to focus on financially strong customers and hence 
exclude the first from their services.
Several critical studies have questioned the idea that privatization brings 
more well-being and quality of life to the poor in Nigeria (Ariyo/Jerome, 
2004; Igbuzor, 2003; Osimiri, 2006).
Table 4: Telecommunications statistics for Nigeria
  Y
ea
r
  I
nt
er
ne
t U
se
rs
 p
er
10
0 
In
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
  I
nt
er
ne
t S
ub
sc
ri
be
rs
 
pe
r 1
00
 In
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
  P
C
s 
pe
r 1
00
 In
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
  T
ot
al
 a
nn
ua
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t i
n
 te
le
co
m
 (i
n 
m
ill
io
n 
U
S$
)
  T
ot
al
 P
ho
ne
 S
ub
sc
ri
be
rs
 (M
ob
ile
 a
nd
 F
ix
ed
) p
er
 
10
0 
in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
Pr
ic
e 
of
 3
-m
in
ut
e 
fix
ed
 
   
te
le
ph
on
e 
ca
ll 
(p
ea
k 
pr
iz
e)
  P
ri
ce
 o
f a
 3
-m
in
ut
e 
lo
ca
l 
m
ob
ile
 c
al
l (
pe
ak
 ra
te
)
1993 0,45 0,40 448 0,35 5,8 23
1994 0,19 0,43 458 0,37 5,8 23
1995 0,21 0,48 771 0,41 23
1996 0,01 0,20 0,53 1009 0,41
1997 0,02 0,57 1090 0,40
1998 0,03 0,49 0,61 1611 0,43
1999 0,05 0,56 0,64 394 0,46
2000 0,07 0,27 0,66 355 0,51
2001 0,10 0,26 0,68 710 0,86 12,9 120
2002 0,35 0,47 0,71 1217 1,92 12,9 117
2003 0,61 0,69 0,70 - 3,27 12,9 50
2004 1,39 0,68 2780 8,00 19,5 36
2005 3,80 0,68 3287 15,07
The statistics in table 4 show that the accelerated speed of neo-liberal re-
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forms since 1999 has increased the capital investments in telecommunica-
tions, but the number of internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants is in 2006 
still below 1 user per 100 inhabitants and the price of phone calls from mo-
bile and fixed lines is today much more expensive than 10 years ago. So e.g. 
a three-minute local call at peak time from a fixed line was in 2004 almost 
three times as expensive as in 1994. The number of total phone subscribers 
and internet users has increased during the last years in Nigeria, but that 
more people can afford owning a phone doesn’t mean that they can afford 
using it. Also the number of internet subscribers and PCs per 100 people is 
still  far below 1%,1 which is  an indication that people (besides a lack of 
skills) lack the financial capacities for participating in the information age. 
In 2005 the average dial-up internet access cost US$67 per month and the 
average  cost  for  wireless  access  was  US$1000  per  month  (Adomi  2005), 
whereas the per capita income per month was US$87,5 (UNHDR 2005: 221). 
In Nigeria besides financial access and skills access also power outages pose 
a problem for ICT usage (Adomi, 2005; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka/Adeya, 2004). 
Liberalization  and  privatization  of  telecommunications  markets  haven’t 
solved the problem of the digital divide in Nigeria. This result is similar 
with  the  situation  in  other  African  countries  such  as  Ghana and South-
Africa that have experienced heavy phases of neo-liberal deregulation (cf. 
Fuchs/Horak 2007). Nigeria is a country in which many people don’t have 
access to a phone, let alone internet. This is an expression of the globally 
stratified class structure of  informational capitalism.  A study based on a 
total of 5616 interviews in Nigeria has shown that 36% of the respondents 
have to travel to other towns for making phone-calls, the average travel dis-
tance is  51 km, and the average duration for  such a trip 1 hour and 41 
minutes (Intelcon 2005).
Some scholars have expressed hopes that the internet could be a technolo-
gical fix to Nigeria’s social problems. So e.g. ISOC Nigeria (2005), Chris O. 
Ahiakwo (1999), and Mike Jensen (1999) argue rather naively that telemedi-
cine can provide a solution to the lack of medical practitioners in Nigeria be-
cause patients and doctors could be connected to doctors in developed coun-
1 That there is an increase in internet users per 100 inhabitants might be due to the popularity 
of cyber cafés in Nigeria (Adomi 2005, Adomi/Adogbeji/Oduwole 2005, Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka/Adeya 2004). In 2005 there were more than 2000 cyber cafés in Nigeria, most of 
them in Lagos (Adomi 2005).
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tries. Telemedicine “will greatly face a change to the old and obsolete Nigeri-
an medical  system,  thus granting even the people  that cannot afford good 
medical attention without having to travel out” (ISOC Nigeria 2005). Similar 
hopes were expressed by the Nigerian Minister of Science and Technology in 
his opening address at the conference at which the papers by Ahiakwo and 
Jensen were presented. Internet can improve health and other social commu-
nication, but first of all  among other things much more financial resources 
and skilled practitioners are needed on site in developing countries. 
Another suggestion for improving the situation is to install centres that 
allow free access to computers and the internet, to conduct internet aware-
ness campaigns, and organize courses in digital literacy (e.g. ISOC Nigeria 
2005). Although this strategy also ignores larger societal issues such as the 
income divide between developing and developed countries, it at least is 
looking  for  public  institutions  and  considers  free  access  as  important, 
whereas the commercial strategy simply sees capital accumulation with the 
help of ICTs as a solution.
Liberalizing telecommunications markets hasn’t solved the problem of 
the digital divide in Nigeria and if there is a technological fix to social prob-
lems is highly questionable. These two strategies are two frequently sugges-
ted solutions, but as the more systematic discussion of strategies that will 
follow now shows there are alternative and less one-dimensional strategies 
for solving the problem of the digital divides.
SOLUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL DIGITAL DIVIDE? [4]
We agree with Jan van Dijk that “most likely, the digital divide within de-
veloping countries and between them and the developed world will contin-
ue to rise” (Van Dijk 2005: 185). But this is only the case if the current un-
equal economic and social development of global society continues, which 
clearly  is  not  a  foregone  conclusion.  We  will  now  discuss  six  potential 
strategies for dealing with the global digital divide.
Wolfgang Hofkirchner (2002) has introduced a typology of worldviews 
that is based on the potential relationships between two categories: Reduc-
tionism establishes identity by eliminating the difference for the benefit of 
the  smaller,  less  differentiated part,  projectionism establishes  identity  by 
eliminating the difference for the benefit of the larger, more differentiated 
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side,  dualism eliminates  identity  by establishing  a  difference  of  the  two 
sides, it is a disjunctive approach, finally dialectical thinking integrates the 
two sides so that the two sides have different and identical aspects, they 
yield a unity in diversity. Applying this typology to the realm of identifying 
potential solutions for the digital divide means to consider technology as 
one category and society as the other. Technology in this case is the less dif-
ferentiated side, it forms a part or subsystem of society.
Table 5: A Typology of Potential Solutions to the Digital Divide
Worldview Technology Society
Reductionism
Technological Reductionism: 
Innovationism, Leapfrogging, 
Technophilia
Projectionism Market Fundamentalism
Dualism Technophobia Technophobia
Dialectics Dialectical Integrationism
Strategy 1:  Technological  Reductionism 1 (Innovationism):  Wait  and see, 
market and technological development will cheapen access
Some say that historically new technologies such as electricity, the car, the 
telephone, or television have at first always been expensive and reserved to a 
small elite before they have diffused into society and have become accessible 
for the broad masses.  Concerning the internet  the same would be the case 
and hence one should just wait because after a certain time the digital divide 
would decline due to declining costs of technology and the effects of Moore’s  
law2 (e.g. Compaine, 2001; Norris, 2001). This argument is not suitable for the 
topic of the global digital  divide because  the wealth gap between Western 
and Third World countries is continuously increasing and developing coun-
tries  are  systematically  excluded  from  wealth  and  technological  progress. 
Hence to wait and see won’t solve the problem. Also older technologies such 
as electricity, the telephone or TV are not widespread in developing coun-
tries, there is a general global technological divide.
2 Moore’s law says that the number of transistors on integrated circuits and hence processing 
power doubles every 18 months while the costs don’t increase.
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This strategy can be seen as a form of technological reductionism be-
cause it is believed that the digital divide can be solved due to the character-
istic feature of computer technology that it develops rapidly. 
Strategy  2:  Technological  Reductionism 2  (Leapfrogging):  By  entering 
into markets and competition third world countries will be able leapfrog 
directly into information societies
Will  ICTs help developing countries  in  leapfrogging certain  stages  of 
technological  development  and the  industrial  development  stage  so  that 
they will catch up with Western societies and become information societies? 
Technological leapfrogging means “the implementation of a new and up-to-
date technology in an application area in which at least the previous version 
of that technology has not been deployed“(Davison et al. 2000: 2). “In de-
veloped economies, newer versions of technology are often used to upgrade 
older versions,  but in developing economies where still  older versions of 
technology are often prevalent  (if  they exist  at  all),  the opportunities for 
leapfrogging over the successive generations of technology to the most re-
cent version are that much greater“ (Davison et al. 2000: 2). Leapfrogging 
might indeed be possible (e.g. establishing wireless communication in de-
veloping countries without requiring the earlier stage of a well-developed 
wire-line infrastructure), but the important question is not if leapfrogging is 
possible, but if it will benefit all people or only a tiny class. Market liberaliz-
ation doesn’t automatically result in the affordability of ICTs for all human 
beings, hence we doubt that liberalization enables leapfrogging as e.g. ar-
gued by Pippa Norris (2001: 42): “Given a high-speed backbone, and market 
liberalization of telecommunication services,  African nations may also be 
able to ‘leapfrog’ stages of industrialization through new technology by in-
vesting  in  fully  digitized  telecommunications  networks  rather  than  out-
dated analog-based systems”.
This strategy is also technologically reductionist because here it is argued 
that computer technologies are so flexible that they allow the instant introduc-
tion of the newest standards and that the availability of these standards auto-
matically transforms developing countries into information societies.
Strategy 3:  Technological Reductionism 3 (Technophilia):  Technologies 
for the Third World
Jeffrey James (2003) argues that one possibility for solving the global di-
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vide is to transport old computers from rich to poor countries. The lifetime 
of a Western business computer is only 2-3 years, this is due to rapid tech-
nological  progress  and  the  non-upgradeability  of  most  hardware  which 
causes people to buy new computers every 2 or 3 years as well as heavy 
profits of the hardware and software industry. The danger in exporting old 
computers to developing countries is that the latter will become dumps for 
electronic waste just like many Western corporations and countries consider 
them as dumps for atomic waste. Besides that we see no reason why devel-
oping countries should not have the same right as Western countries to be-
nefit to a full extent from technological progress just like other countries do. 
Nicholas  Negroponte  and the  One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) association 
have introduced the $100 laptop as a strategy for advancing computer tech-
nology in developing countries. The problem is that this is a technology that 
is  inferior to  Western  standards  (very slow processor,  no  hard disk  and 
drives, etc.) and hence can be produced and sold rather cheaply. If the $100 
laptop is widely diffused in the Third World, Western actors selling these 
computers will derive profits, and a global divide in technological progress 
and  standards  will  emerge  that  separates  advanced  Western  technology 
users from users of less-advanced technologies in the Third World. What is 
needed are not new business strategies, but solutions to the material and so-
cial causes of the global digital divide as well as free advanced hardware, 
infrastructure, and software that are based on open standards and copy-left 
licenses.  That  Microsoft  and Intel  are  critical  of  the  $100  laptop  doesn’t 
mean that it is automatically a good idea; this is rather a manifestation of 
the  competition for  profit  and customers  in  developing  countries.  Open 
source  technologies  have  a  potential  to  transcend  market  logic,  what  is 
needed is an advanced $0 laptop with free software for people in develop-
ing countries as well as criticism of the capitalist logic that has caused the 
divide between developing and developed countries and solutions to the 
social, economic, political, and cultural inequalities that underpin the global 
digital divide.  
Open source  software  or  free  software is  software  that  provides  four 
kinds of freedom for the user (Free Software Foundation 1996):
a) The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.
b) The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to specific 
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needs. Access to the source code is a precondition for this. 
c) The freedom to redistribute copies so that someone can help his neigh-
bour.
d) The freedom to improve the program, and release these improvements to 
the public, so that the whole community benefits. Again access to the source 
code is a precondition for this. 
Open source software has been realized mainly within projects such as 
the Linux operating system. Special licences (termed copy-left) such as the 
GNU-public license have been developed for assuring that free software has 
an open access to  its  source code.  Free software hardly yields economic 
profit;  it  is  freely available on the internet  and constitutes an alternative 
model  of  production  that  questions  proprietary  production  models.  The 
main reason why free software is a good opportunity for developing coun-
tries is not that it is cheap (James 2003), but rather that by using free soft-
ware developing countries don’t depend on Western corporations such as 
Microsoft which aim not primarily at solving the digital divide, but at accu-
mulating capital in developing regions by creating dependencies on West-
ern technological standards such as Windows. Examples for a large-scale 
adoption of open source software can be found e.g. in Mexico, China, Zimb-
abwe, Ethiopia, and Mozambique (Grassmuck 2004: 323-328).
The technophile strategy is a specific form of technological reductionism, 
it is very optimistic concerning the introduction of new and alternative com-
puter technologies and argues that such technologies should be given to the 
third world for free or at low costs. 
Strategy 4: Economic Projectionism (Market Fundamentalism):  Attracting 
foreign capital will increase wealth for all and access in developing countries
Some stakeholders  and scientists  argue that liberalizing telecommunica-
tions markets in developing countries will attract  Western corporations to in-
vest in the ICT sector in these regions and that this will result in economic 
growth that benefits all and lowers internet and phone prices due to compet-
ition (e.g. Murelli 2002). It is naïve to assume that capitalists aim primarily at 
solving the digital divide, Western investment is only due to the search for 
new opportunities of expanding capital accumulation. The reality is as that 
the economic growth caused by Western investments in ICT markets benefits 
Western corporations and a small local elite, but does not at all assure access 
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for all to ICTs and benefits from ICTs for all (Fuchs/Horak 2007). 
ICT applications in the areas of e-commerce, e-travelling, e-government, 
e-transport, e-health, e-education, e-learning, etc. are mainly developed in 
Western  countries  and benefit  under  current  conditions  mainly  Western 
corporations if they are exported to developing countries because these cor-
porations  can  extract  profit  by  establishing  dependencies  on  Western-
defined  standards.  The  Third  World  is  not  only  largely  excluded  from 
wealth, but also from technological progress. In 1999 there was 56 billion 
dollars in Western foreign aid for the Third World and the latter paid 136 
billion dollars debt service to Western countries (Fuchs 2002: 370).  Hence in 
total  there was a value transfer  from developing countries  to  developed 
countries. Although Africans makes up 14,1% of world population, Africa 
only accounts for 3% of the number of global internet users.
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) sees a sustainable 
information society as a society in which ICTs promote participation and 
poverty eradication. For achieving a sustainable information society in de-
veloping countries, the WSIS Plan of Action (WSIS 2003) argues on the one 
hand that debt cancellation is needed, on the other hand that more private 
national and international markets for ICTs should be provided by develop-
ing countries. What is missing here is the insight that markets don’t auto-
matically eliminate poverty because  they don’t  determine how wealth is 
distributed. Hence public institutions and regulatory practices are needed 
that ensure that all can enjoy the benefits from ICTs and economic produc-
tion. WSIS sees capital only as a positive factor in achieving sustainable de-
velopment. It assesses ICT markets as very positive means for advancing so-
cial sustainability, it neglects aspects of political regulation of the economy 
and income distribution, and gives priority to economic logic.
The market-oriented strategy is a form of projectionism, it argues that 
the solution to the digital divide can be achieved within only one subsystem 
of society, the economy. Market-driven and profit-oriented development is 
considered as best practice.
Strategy 5: Dualistic  Technophobia:  The Third World doesn’t  need techno-
logy
Some analysts argue that there is no need for technology in the Third 
World because there would be more basic problems such as poverty, health 
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issues, and illiteracy. E.g. Ted Turner, the founder of CNN, has argued: “We 
talk about the digital divide. We talk about it all the time at Time-Warner 
too. We want to get computers in everyone's hands. But half the people in 
the world don't have electricity. Over a billion don't have access to clean 
drinking water. Forget the digital divide, they need food, water, clothing, 
shelter and a chance for an education.“3
Information and communication is just like social security a fundamental 
human right. This right is explicitly mentioned in article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opin-
ion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without in-
terference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers“. In information societies opinions are 
increasingly expressed and articulated with the help of the internet and oth-
er new media. Hence material, usage, and skills access to new technologies 
is a contemporary expression of a fundamental human right. It is unjust that 
Western citizens enjoy more human rights and economic, social, cultural, 
and technological resources than citizens in developing countries. 
The technophobe strategy is dualistic,  it considers technology as com-
pletely  unimportant,  as  a  mechanism that  can under no societal  circum-
stances do any good. Technology and society are completely separated and 
technology is considered as unimportant.
Strategy 6: Dialectical integrationism: An integrated strategy combining 
the global redistribution of wealth, educational and health programs, digital 
literacy programs;  public  and free access to computers and technologies, 
open source technologies, and computers for the Third World
All five strategies discussed so far are reductionistic and one-dimension-
al, they don’t see the interconnectedness of technology access, social factors, 
uneven  development,  human  rights,  and  global  capitalism.  In  order  to 
tackle the global digital divide a fundamental redistribution of resources is 
needed as a precondition.  Modern society is so rich and productive that it 
could easily afford a modest income, social security, literacy, and free access 
to computers and the internet for all humans. If this is a real possibility, 
then the best and most desirable option is to realize it. But this requires a re-
3 http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/donor-letters/2000/Donor2000-07.shtml,  accessed 
on October 31st, 2006.
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design of global society because the digital divide is not first of all a techno-
logical problem, but an economic, social, and political issue. The digital di-
vide is not only a divide in the access to and benefits from technology, but it 
also an expression of a more general divide in wealth and power. In order 
to close the global divide first of all measures such as a fundamental global 
redistribution  of  wealth,  a  full  cancellation  of  all  debts  of  development 
countries, a multiplication of development aid, the provision of free public 
health and educational programs, and a basic income guarantee for all abso-
lutely poor individuals (that could be financed e.g. by a Tobin tax) could be 
realized. Based on such a material foundation further measures such as the 
support of publicly provided free access to computers and internet for all, 
the public provision of digital literacy programs, local hardware production 
that aims at free or cheap local products and the large-scale adoption and 
production of free software-technologies (that are adapted to local needs) 
by developing countries  seem to be feasible.  Western actors  or countries 
could also provide computers and equipment for free to the Third World, 
but these technologies should be technologically advanced, non-commer-
cial,  non-proprietary,  free of cost,  and open source in order to avoid the 
deepening of existing or emergence of new dependencies. Access to techno-
logies should be universal, guaranteed by the public, free of cost, and based 
on open source. That it should be universal means that it should be guaran-
teed to all people. This can best be achieved if provided not by private or-
ganizations, but by public ones (such as communities) because the latter are 
not based on profit interests that might undermine universality, but on the 
common interest in common goods. The best guarantee for avoiding the 
emergence of capitalist interests in technology that might undermine uni-
versal access and the dependency of developing countries on Western capit-
al, technologies, and interests, is the provision and development of techno-
logies that are free of cost (“free access for all”) and open source (accessible 
source code in order to advance co-operative engineering, high quality, and 
free access). Open source technologies can advance the emergence of local 
and regional communities for co-operative technology development that act 
independently from Western interests and the logic of profitability.
One innovative measure is to establish public funds for free access tele-
communication services. In Brazil the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) gov-
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ernment has established a fund for universal telecommunications services 
(FUST) financed in part by a one per cent tax on the gross revenues of tele-
communications service  providers.  It  provides ICT resources for schools, 
health facilities, and rural communities. Such funds can be financed as the 
Brazilian example shows by taxing capital and/or by development aid. An 
integrative strategy of fundamental redistribution mechanisms, free public 
access, educational and health programs, a gift economy, open source and 
open  access  technologies  seems  most  promising  to  us.  One-dimensional 
strategies ignore the interconnectedness of technological and societal issues. 
For overcoming the digital divide more fundamental strategies that aim at 
changing society and departing from the dominance of capitalist logic are 
needed.
The strategy of dialectical integrationism integrates societal and political 
measures in the areas of poverty reduction, development aid, debt service, 
health, or education, with the introduction of alternative technologies that 
can support local societal development and are in line with local knowledge 
and needs. This strategy is not one-sided and much more complex and real-
istic than the other five.
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